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Abstract
In the present paper I introduce \keeping up with the Joneses preferences"in an
otherwise standard heterogeneous agent economy. The model simulations show that
this kind of preferences can generate a substantial increase in wealth inequality com-
pared to an equal model with standard expected utility.
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1 Introduction
Standard heterogeneous agent models assume that utility depends on the level of personal
consumption. Despite this there is a long tradition in economic thinking dating back to
Veblen (1899) and Duesenberry (1949) that has recognized that interpersonal comparisons
can play an important role in motivating economic actions including consumption and saving
behavior. In the present paper I apply this classical insight about the role of interpersonal
comparisons to a standard modern quantitative model of saving, that is, the precautionary
saving model.
More precisely I propose a version of the classical model of Aiyagari (1994) where I
assume that an agent's utility depends not only on her personal consumption but also on
an external reference consumption level dened as the average consumption of agents in
the earnings group immediately above its own. I nd that the model can increase wealth
inequality by a substantial amount. The magnitude of the increase depends both on the
strength of the external habit motive and on the persistence of the earnings process with a
high persistence needed for this magnitude to be large.
A number of recent papers have found empirical support for the old idea that interper-
sonal comparison of economic outcomes matter. As an example Luttmer (2005) studies the
impact of average local income on self-reported well-being and nds a negative relationship
as strong as the positive relationship between the latter variable and own income. His results
also suggest that the channel is through utility functions that depend on relative consump-
tion in addition to absolute consumption. In a slightly dierent vein, Bertrand and Morse
(2013) and Frank et al. (2014) test empirically the relationship between other's income,
as expressed by the top income shares, and dierent economic choices like consumption of
middle-income households or bankruptcy rates at the state or county level. In all cases they
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nd a positive relationship. The cited literature provides an empirical motivation for the
present study. The distinctive contribution of this paper consists of extending the study
of the role of inter-personal comparisons in consumption, that have so far been studied in
empirical or theoretical settings, to a quantitative model and to explore their role in shaping
wealth inequality.
2 The Model
I study the steady-state properties of a neoclassical economy with no aggregate uncertainty.
The economy is populated by a measure one of innitely lived households. Households are
endowed with a unit of time that they supply inelastically to the labor market. Each period
they receive a shock to their eciency units of labor that I denote with e. I assume that
e belongs to a nite set E = fe1; :::::::; eng and that it follows a rst-order Markov process
that can described with a transition probability matrix . Households evaluate the utility
of a ow of consumption c by using the function:
U(c; C) =
c1 C
1   (1)
where  is the coecient of relative risk aversion with respect to own consumption and 
denes the impact on the household's utility of the average consumption level of a reference
group. When  > 0 any addition to the consumption of the reference group raises the
marginal utility of own individual consumption: consumption becomes more valuable since
it helps \keeping up with the Joneses". This utility function has been used in Gal (1994)
and is also a special case of the function used by Abel (1990). In those articles the reference
consumption group was the set of all households in the economy. In the present context
with no aggregate uncertainty the average consumption is constant and would wash out of
the agents' rst order conditions, making it irrelevant. It is thus assumed that for agents
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endowed with an earnings shock inferior to the top one, the reference group is the set of
all agents with the next higher earnings shock. Agents with the highest earnings shocks on
the other hand do not have an external reference group. Formally, for agents with earnings
shock i 2 f1; 2; ::::; ng
Ui(c; C) =
c1 C
1   (2)
where C = 1 if i = n and C = C(ei+1) if i < n where C = C(ei+1) is the average
consumption for agents with earnings shock i+ 1.
The choice to use earnings one step above as the characteristic that denes reference
groups seems natural given that the consumption externality plausibly arises as a conse-
quence of exposure to other groups' consumption. In light of this it is reasonable to think
that earnings poor households are not likely to be much exposed to the top earners life-styles
since they are likely not to live in the same neighborhood or share the same workplace but
for the same reasons they are more likely to know the consumption possibilities of other
households that earn a bit more than them. Also the choice of earnings rather than wealth or
income is convenient because it leads to a straightforward extension of well-known methods
to solve the model.1 Having utility depend on consumption of the earnings group immedi-
ately above implies that consumption at the top of the earnings distribution will indirectly
aect consumption at all points of that distribution down to the bottom. This idea was
termed \consumption cascades"by Frank et al. (2014).
There are no state contingent markets to insure household specic earnings risk. In
order to save, the household has access to a single asset that pays interest at a rate r. I
denote the amount of assets held by the household by a and I assume that a 2 A  [a;1).
1Dening the consumption reference by wealth groups would be problematic from a numerical point of
view since it would lead to discontinuities in the value function around the thresholds dening the groups.
The same applies to income which depends on wealth through the earned interest component.
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Given the preferences and asset structure specied above we directly write the household's
optimization problem in dynamic programming form. The state variables of this problem
are the shock to its endowment of eciency units of labor and its assets at the beginning
of the period, that is, the pair fa; eg. The problem thus reads:
V (a; e) = max
c;a0
n
u(c; C) + EV (a0; e0)
o
(3)
subject to the resource constraint
a0 = ew + (1 + r)a  c (4)
a forecasting rule for the reference group's consumption
C = C(e) (5)
and the no-borrowing constraint
a  0 (6)
In the resource constraint (4) w is the rental rate for each eciency unit of labor and r is
the rental rate on capital. In the value function equation (3)  is the standard subjective
discount factor and E is the expectation operator.
Aggregate output is produced by a representative rm operating under perfect competi-
tion via a standard neoclassical, constant return to scale production function Y = F (K;L),
where Y is aggregate output, K is the total amount of capital and L is the total amount
of labor used in production. The output can be indierently used for investment and con-
sumption. Capital depreciates at a constant rate  2 [0; 1].
The equilibrium for this economy can be dened in the usual way and is thus omitted
for the sake of brevity.2
2The only slight variation is that we need to insure consistency between the forecasting rule for the
consumption of reference groups C(e) with the actual average consumption of those groups C(e).
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3 Parameter Calibration
The model is calibrated taking a year as the length of the period. Technology is dened by
a standard Cobb-Douglas production function:
Y = KL1  (7)
and the capital share  is set at 0.35. The depreciation rate of capital  is xed at 0.06. The
Markov chain for the eciency units of labor is obtained by discretizing an AR(1) process
in logarithms:
ln et =  ln et 1 + "t (8)
where " is a normal i.i.d. random variable, independently distributed across agents, with
mean 0 and variance 2" . For the autocorrelation coecient I use two values. As a baseline
I set  = 0:95 which is the value estimated by Storesletten et al. (2004). I also explore the
quantitative properties of the model under a lower persistence scenario where  is set to the
value of 0.9. The value of " is set implicitly by xing the coecient of variation of earnings.
This takes the value of 0.2 based on Aiyagari (1994). With respect to preferences,  is set
at 0.96 and the coecient of relative risk aversion is 1.5, close to the estimate by Attanasio
et al. (1999). The remaining parameter to be set is  which determines the strength of the
impact of the reference group's average consumption on the household's marginal utility.
Since it was not possible to nd estimates in the literature I resort to performing several
experiments with dierent values of  and in particular I consider values of 0.35, 0.65 and
0.8. Given the functional form of the period utility index, the special case  = 0 corresponds
to the standard utility case and will be presented for comparison.
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4 Results
I explore the behavior of the wealth distribution in the model when the strength of the
externality in consumption and the persistence of the earnings process vary and how the
eects of  and  interact.
Table 1 and table 2 describe the results. The tables also report the corresponding gures
for the data, taken from Campanale (2007) and based on the 1998 issue of the Survey of
Consumer Finances. Table 1 reports the value of the Gini index. In the rst line of the
bottom sub-panel we can see that in the higher earnings persistence case the Gini index
of wealth increases from 0.572 in the standard utility model to 0.773 in the expenditure
cascades model, corresponding to a 35 percent increase. The increase occurs along the
whole range of values of  and is such that even with an underlying earnings distribution
that is more equal than the one in the data the model can generate the same Gini index
of wealth found in the data.3 The consumption externality thus turns out to be a powerful
mechanism to increase wealth inequality. The second line of the panel reports the eect of
 on wealth inequality when earnings are less persistent. The Gini index increases, thus
conrming the previous result qualitatively. At the quantitative level the increase is more
modest: from 0.494 in the standard utility case to 0.550 in the consumption cascades model,
an increase of 11.3 percent. The comparison of the results in the two panels suggests that
while the concern for relative consumption may be a powerful factor to increase wealth
inequality, a high persistence of earnings plays a crucial role in magnifying this factor.4
3According to Campanale (2007) the Gini index for earnings is 0.63 in the data. In the model it is 0.2
by construction.
4The intuition for this result is that in the present model the earnings shock aects not only the budget
constraint but also the utility of current consumption, adding an extra degree of uncertainty to the standard
Aiyagari (1994) model. This increased uncertainty leads to higher wealth inequality. In turn this extra
uncertainty, hence the increase in wealth inequality, becomes larger when the consumption distribution
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Table 1: Gini index of wealth: data and selected values of  and 
Data
0.78
Model  = 0  = 0:35  = 0:65  = 0:8
 = 0:95 0.572 0.608 0.700 0.773
 = 0:9 0.494 0.502 0.518 0.550
Table 2: The distribution of wealth for selected values of  and : percentage
share of wealth by percentiles
Percentiles bottom 40 top 20 top 10 top 5 top 1
Data 1.35 79.5 66.1 53.5 29.5
 = 0:95
 = 0 4.1 57.1 35.6 21.0 5.5
 = 0:35 3.5 61.6 40.0 24.6 7.0
 = 0:65 1.4 72.3 49.9 32.3 10.4
 = 0:80 0.2 80.9 58.9 40.2 14.8
 = 0:9
 = 0 8.3 50.6 30.9 18.0 4.7
 = 0:35 8.0 51.5 31.6 18.5 4.9
 = 0:65 7.4 53.1 32.9 19.5 5.3
 = 0:8 6.0 56.0 35.7 21.7 6.3
8
A more detailed picture of wealth inequality is given in table 2. The table is organized
in three sub-panels. In the top sub-panel I report the share of wealth held by dierent
percentiles of the distribution in the data. The middle sub-panel reports the same gures
for the model with high earnings persistence and the bottom sub-panel does the same for the
model with low earnings persistence. Focusing on the second sub-panel we can see that the
share of wealth held by the bottom 40 percent of the distribution falls from 4.1 percent in
the standard model to 1.4 percent in the model with  equal to 0.65 and to only 0.2 percent
in the model with  equal to 0.8. Moving to the other columns of the panel we see that the
share of wealth of the top 20 percent increases from 57.1 percent to 80.9 percent, the share
of the top 5 percent almost doubles from 21 percent to 40.2 percent and the share of the
top 1 percent almost triples from 5.5 percent to 14.8 percent when we move from the model
with standard utility to the model with the highest value of the external habit parameter.
The gure for the top 1 percent is still only half its empirical counterpart, however as it was
mentioned before the model earnings concentration falls quite short of the data.
In the case with  equal to 0.9 the introduction of external habit can still reduce the
share of wealth of the bottom 40 percent and increase the share held by the top groups
but the eects are quantitatively smaller: as examples, the third column shows that the
share of the top 20 percent increases from 50.6 to 56 percent and the sixth column that the
share of the top 1 percent increases from 4.7 percent to 6.3 percent when we move from 
equal to 0 to  equal to 0.8. These results thus conrm that introducing external habits
may have powerful eects in increasing wealth inequality when coupled with substantial
earnings persistence.5
becomes more dispersed which is what happens in this class of models when earnings persistence increases.
5I performed similar simulations with dierent values of risk-aversion and of ". The results were similar
and are thus not reported for the sake of brevity.
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5 Conclusions
In the present paper I have introduced \keeping up with the Joneses "preferences in a Bewley
type of model that is a workhorse of modern macroeconomics. It has been shown that the
model can generate a sizeable increase in wealth inequality provided that the strength of
the external habit is relatively high and is combined with substantial persistence in the
earnings process. This result suggests that the introduction of external habits may have
important eects in the predictions of standard heterogeneous agent models. This warrants
further research in the area. A natural extension would be to recast the model in a life-cycle
framework with bequests and a more elaborate and realistic earnings process and study the
eect of these preferences in this richer setting.
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